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 Political Confederation
 JACQUES CREMER Universit6 des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse
 THOMAS R. PALFREY California Institute of Technology
 T lhis article extends the spatial model of voting to study the implications of different institutional
 structures of federalism along two dimensions: degree of centralization and mode of representation.
 The representation dimension varies the weight between unit representation (one state, one vote) and
 population-proportional representation (one person, one vote). Voters have incomplete information and can
 reduce policy risk by increasing the degree of centralization or increasing the weight on unit representation.
 We derive induced preferences over the degree of centralization and the relative weights of the two modes of
 representation, and we study the properties of majority rule voting over these two basic dimensions of
 federalism. Moderates prefer more centralization than extremists, and voters in large states generally have
 different preferences from voters in small states. This implies two main axes of conflict in decisions
 concerning political confederation: moderates versus extremists and large versus small states.
 E pisodes of political confederation or the oppo-
 site, political dissolution, are widely observed
 and important phenomena. Yet, the forces un-
 derlying the processes of confederation are not well
 understood. There are many different levels of political
 units, ranging from towns and villages to states or
 provinces, to nation-states, to supranational bodies
 such as the United Nations and the European Union.
 Generally rules exist that govern both the interaction
 between units of different levels and the allocation of
 decision-making authority among them. It is the deter-
 mination of such rules and the development of a
 theoretical foundation for studying them that we ad-
 dress in this article. We call this the problem of political
 confederation.
 Political confederation is one of the most fundamen-
 tal problems in political science. It arises in many
 contexts, both large and small. Several examples come
 immediately to mind:
 * the ceding of sovereignty to international organiza-
 tions by member nations;
 * the issue of "states rights" in American politics;
 * the nature of representation of provinces in national
 assemblies;
 * the allocation of taxing authority in a federal system;
 * the adoption of uniform standards across jurisdic-
 tions (pollution, education, roads, etc.);
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 * the formation of nation-states; and
 * the rules for amending constitutions.
 A number of specific examples have been studied in
 great detail by scholars of history and political science,
 particularly with regard to the evolution and collapse of
 international organizations and the drafting of consti-
 tutions. Most of this work attempts to describe the
 important forces that were operative in those isolated
 incidents, and it provides some useful insights into the
 problem. Here we attempt to capture some general
 features of the problem in a formal model and to
 derive some theoretical implications.
 We model a confederation as a collection of districts,
 together with rules for the aggregation of preferences
 of the members of the various districts, which produces
 policy outcomes that can vary across districts. The
 districts can be thought of as regions, provinces, coun-
 ties, villages, or other well-defined decentralized polit-
 ical units. The larger body is referred to as the "con-
 federation," and it can be thought of as any political
 unit that contains some collection of smaller political
 units.
 In terms more familiar to economists than political
 scientists, it is a mechanism design problem, that is, a
 metadecision-making problem in which the decision to
 be taken is a set of rules for making decisions. It can
 also be thought of as the problem of constitutional
 design. What makes the problem of constitutional
 design especially complicated is that the designers
 themselves have preferences over the outcomes and
 policies that ultimately will be decided according to the
 rules for preference aggregation that are chosen at the
 constitution-making stage.1 Thus, the designers will
 have induced preferences over the rules that will depend
 on their preferences over policy outcomes and the
 specific features of their own district.
 1 See the historical analyses of the formation of the U.S. Constitu-
 tion, such as Riker (1984, 1986). Grofman and Wittman (1989)
 present a collection of articles that emphasize the important connec-
 tion between policy preferences and induced preferences over insti-
 tutions. These and other studies provide convincing evidence that
 this link played a prominent role in the design of the U.S. Constitu-
 tion.
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 Our simple framework combines the standard spatial
 model of political competition with the presence of
 asymmetric information and multiple districts. It builds
 on the model of Cremer and Palfrey (1996), in which
 voters from a district know only their own ideal point in
 a policy space and some common information about
 the distribution of preferences in their district and in
 other districts. With incomplete information, the policy
 outcomes that emerge from different rules of confed-
 eration are uncertain prospects, so the induced prefer-
 ences over confederations reflect not only a voter's
 ideal point but also a voter's attitudes about risky
 outcomes. In the standard Downsian model, prefer-
 ences necessarily exhibit some degree of concavity with
 respect to outcomes, which produces risk aversion if
 the policy outcomes are uncertain.
 Cremer and Palfrey (1996) considered only two
 polar cases. At one extreme, the null confederation,
 there is no national government at all, and the policy
 outcomes of different jurisdictions are determined in-
 dependently, simply as the median preference of the
 district. At the opposite extreme, the districts cede all
 sovereignty to a central authority, so that all districts
 have the same policy, which is decided by the median of
 the nation (composed of all the districts, aggregated
 together). Because voters do not know the preferences
 of other voters, the two policy outcomes under the
 different systems (independent versus confederated)
 are random variables that differ in both their condi-
 tional mean and variance. Because preferences are
 quadratic and the uncertainty is normally distributed,
 the induced preferences depend only on the mean and
 variance, and this leads to clean analytical solutions.
 The basic trade-off for voters is that centralization
 leads to policy outcomes that are, on average, farther
 from their ideal point, while the risk associated with
 the centralized government is lower than the risk
 associated with independent policymaking. The latter
 follows from the fact that the component of risk due to
 interdistrict variance of policy outcomes is reduced
 with confederation. We call this risk reduction the
 principle of moderation. As far as we know, this princi-
 ple has never been formalized before, but it is not new,
 for it played a central role in Madison's arguments for
 the unification of the American states in the late
 eighteenth century. For example, it is related to the
 problem of extreme political factions discussed in
 Federalist #10 (Madison et al. [1788] 1937, 61-2):
 The influence of faction leaders may kindle a flame
 within their particular States, but will be unable to spread
 a general conflagration through the other States. A reli-
 gious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part
 of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over
 the entire face of it must secure the national councils
 against any danger from that source. A rage for paper
 money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of
 property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will
 be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a
 particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a
 malady is more likely to taint a particular county or
 district, than an entire State.
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 The central finding in Cremer and Palfrey (1996) is
 that moderate voters prefer centralization and extreme
 voters oppose it. Specifically, there is a critical voter
 ideal point such that all voters whose ideal point is
 closer to the expected median prefer centralization,
 and all voters whose ideal point is farther away from
 the expected median prefer separatism. We extend this
 model in two ways.
 First, we consider a much broader range of consti-
 tutions than the two extreme cases of "all or nothing"
 national government. These intermediate cases are
 obtained by representing the policy outcome in a
 district along a continuum of possible mixes between
 purely federal and purely local policy. We call this the
 centralization dimension and show below that it cap-
 tures a wide range of "federal" systems, in which the
 relative power of a district in affecting policies in other
 districts is allowed to vary.
 Second, we introduce another dimension to the
 confederation design, the representation dimension. We
 consider two contrasting notions of representational
 formulas, one in which a local unit's representation at
 the national level is proportional to the population of
 the unit, termed population-proportional representa-
 tion,2 and one in which each district receives the same
 absolute representation, termed unit representation. An
 example of these two extremes is found in the U.S.
 Congress; if we think of states as the basic units of the
 confederation, the House of Representatives approxi-
 mates population representation, and the Senate has
 unit representation. Hereafter, we sometimes refer to
 these two types of representation as "House" and
 "Senate," respectively. Our representation dimension
 considers linear combinations of these two schemes,
 which can loosely be thought of as the allocation of
 power between two different chambers in a bicameral
 national legislature (again using the U.S. analogy}y
 Madison also discusses the trade-off between unit
 and population representation. While the latter pro-
 vides greater retention of local sovereignty for large
 states, the former is a more effective way to moderate
 factions, especially those from large states. Madison
 addresses the issue of why one ought to have unit
 (Senate) in addition to population (House) represen-
 tation in the legislative body,3 and he realizes that unit
 representation of states helps resolve a trade-off be-
 tween loss of sovereignty and moderation, in a way that
 all states (large and small) should come to recognize it
 as a good solution to the representation problem. Here
 is an example of Madison's discussion, taken from
 Federalist #62 (Madison et al. [1788] 1937, 401-2).4
 2 For the rest of the article, we shorten this to population represen-
 tation.
 3His terms are "equal" and "proportional" representation, respec-
 tively. Because modern usage of those terms has changed, we adopt
 the terms unit representation and population representation to avoid
 confusion.
 4 Madison was also well aware that small states would be more likely
 to ratify a constitution that provided for unit as well as population
 representation: "The equality of representation in the Senate is
 another point, which, being evidently the result of compromise
 between the opposite pretensions of the large and the small States,
 does not call for much discussion.... A government founded on
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 ... in a compound republic, partaking both of the
 national and federal character, the government ought to
 be founded on a mixture of the principles of proportional
 [population] and equal [unit] representation... In this
 spirit, it may be remarked, that the equal vote allowed to
 each State is at once a constitutional recognition of the
 portion of sovereignty remaining in the individual states,
 and an instrument for preserving that residuary sover-
 eignty.
 Accordingly, we examine these various trade-offs in a
 formal theoretical model by characterizing induced
 voter preferences over a two-dimensional set of possi-
 ble constitutions, with centralization and representa-
 tion as the two axes. In the context of a normal-
 quadratic model,5 we obtain the following results.
 1. Voter preferences over representation depend on
 the degree of centralization, and vice versa. As the
 level of centralization increases, voters from large
 states prefer more population representation (i.e.,
 more House power), while voters from small states
 prefer less population representation (i.e., more
 Senate power). As the weight on population repre-
 sentation increases, voters from large states prefer
 more centralization, while voters from small states
 prefer less centralization.
 2. Each voter has an induced ideal point that consists
 entirely of unit representation with a most-preferred
 level of centralization that depends on the voter's
 ideal point in the underlying policy space but not on
 the district size. Interestingly, this applies equally to
 voters from large states (relative population size
 greater than 1/n), who sacrifice power to small
 states under unit representation.
 3. Consistent with the findings of Cremer and Palfrey
 (1996), more extreme voters want less centraliza-
 tion.
 4. A majority rule equilibrium over the two-dimen-
 sional confederation issue exists within each district.
 5. An interdistrict majority rule equilibrium over the
 two-dimensional confederation issue always exists in
 the case of two districts. The equilibrium mix of
 representation can range from completely popula-
 tion based to completely unit based, including all
 mixtures in between. The exact mixture depends on
 the underlying distributions of voter preferences
 and of district sizes.
 6. Conditional on any level of centralization, prefer-
 ences are single peaked in the representation di-
 mension, for any number of districts. Thus, there
 always exists a conditional majority rule equilibrium,
 which typically involves a mix of population and unit
 representation.
 7. An equilibrium across all voters in all districts may
 or may not exist with more than two districts.
 Several examples are given to illustrate the range of
 possibilities.
 principles more consonant to the wishes of the larger States, is not
 likely to be obtained from the smaller States" (Madison et al. [1788]
 1937, 401). This property is also captured in our model.
 5 We discuss below the robustness of our results to alternative
 specifications.
 Result 1 is quite intuitive. When voters think there is
 too much power in the central government, they wish
 to have greater influence on central decisions. Voters
 in small states have more say under a system of unit
 representation than population representation,
 whereas the reverse is true for voters in large states.
 Results 2 and 3 follow from the basic intuition devel-
 oped in Cremer and Palfrey (1996). All voters benefit
 from centralization due to its mitigating effect on policy
 risk.6 This risk is reduced more efficiently (i.e., with a
 less powerful central government) if representation is
 unit based, simply because equal shares maximize the
 diversification.7 Result 4 follows from the fact that the
 indifference curves of voters from the same district are
 lined up symmetrically. Result 5 follows from the fact
 that with two districts voter indifference curves are
 straight lines, so the problem is virtually one dimen-
 sional. Result 6 is true because indifference curves are
 convex, with unique conditional ideal points. The non-
 existence possibility in result 7 derives from two prop-
 erties of the model: (1) the strong interaction of
 individual preferences between the centralization and
 representation dimension, and (2) the fact that this
 interaction works in opposite ways for small and large
 districts.
 Results 5 and 6 are particularly noteworthy because
 they show that our theoretical model can account for
 the variety of balances between population and unit
 representation observed at the national level. More-
 over, our model gives some indication of how this mix
 varies with the underlying distribution of preferences,
 the number of subnational regions, and the size distri-
 bution of regions. This is discussed and documented in
 Tsebelis and Money (1997), in the context of their
 comparative study of bicameral legislative systems.
 One striking feature, for example, is that it is common
 for upper houses in bicameral systems to have unit
 representation: "In upper houses where local political
 units (states, cantons, regions, departments, or coun-
 ties) are granted unit representation, such as the
 United States and Switzerland, some citizens' votes are
 weighted much more heavily than others. This pattern
 is visible in approximately one-third of all bicameral
 legislatures" (Tsebelis and Money 1997, 53). This is
 also observed in supranational organizations such as
 the European Parliament and the United Nations. We
 know of no other formal model that accounts for the
 ubiquity of unit representation and at the same time is
 consistent with the empirical fact that mixtures of unit
 and population representation are commonly ob-
 served.
 The rest of the article is organized as follows. In the
 next section, we introduce the model and notation. We
 then characterize the induced preferences over the
 two-dimensional space of confederations-representa-
 tion and centralization. Finally, we present our results
 6 This statement applies to both extreme and moderate voters. For
 sufficiently extreme voters, however, this risk-reduction benefit is
 outweighed by the fact that the expected centralized outcome is very
 far from their ideal point.
 7 If districts had different variances, then equal shares might not lead
 to the most efficient diversification of risk.
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 on the existence and properties of majority rule equi-
 libria. Formal proofs are given in the Appendix.
 THE MODEL
 A confederation is composed of n districts, in each of
 which there is a continuum of individuals. The relative
 size of district i is denoted ci > 0, where >,= 1 oci = 1.
 The underlying policy space is one dimensional and
 represented by 9A, the set of real numbers. We assume
 that the political process within any district yields a
 policy that is the ideal point of the median voter of that
 district.
 Each individual has an ideal policy, t E 9X, which we
 also call his type. If policy x EE 91 is adopted, the utility
 of an individual of type t is
 U(x; t) = -(x t)2.
 When voting over confederations, the agent is uncer-
 tain about the outcome. In this case, between two
 distributions over policies he prefers the distribution
 with the higher expected utility.
 An individual is represented by his type, t, and the
 district, i, to which he belongs. The distribution of
 voter preferences is determined by two components.
 The first is the vector of district medians, each of which
 is an independent draw from a normal distribution,
 with mean 0 and variance V. The vector of district
 medians is denoted m = (mi1, . . . , m) . Within
 district i, the ideal policies (types) of the continuum of
 voters follow a normal distribution, with mean mi and
 variance equal to 1. Thus, there is a partial sorting of
 preferences of voters, by district, since the ideal points
 of district i are centered around that district's median,
 and (with probability one) this median is different from
 the median of each of the other n - 1 districts. Each
 individual only knows her own type, the district to
 which she belongs, the relative size of all districts, and
 V, but she does not know the vector of district medi-
 ans.8
 Confederations
 A confederation is an institutional arrangement in
 which the policies of different districts are, at least in
 part, influenced by the preferences of voters from other
 districts in the confederation. In practice, this is usually
 accomplished through a complex array of overlapping
 jurisdictions, representative governments at different
 levels, and a legal system that allocates decision-
 making authority and responsibility across these differ-
 ent levels. The end result is ultimately a vector of
 policies, one for each district. We denote such a vector
 of policies by x = (x1, ..., Xn).
 Given the set of institutions and the legal system
 8 This can be generalized in a number of ways. For example, voters
 could have additional information about their own district, there
 could be correlation between mi and ot, or there could be different
 within-district variances. See Cr6mer and Palfrey (1996) for a
 discussion of these and other possible extensions.
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 governing the overlapping jurisdictions, we can think of
 x as emerging as a function of the underlying prefer-
 ences in all the different districts. Since we take "dis-
 trict" to be the smallest political unit, and since we
 assume that political competition within a district will
 be driven by the median voter of that district, we write
 x = C(m1, . . *, mJ)
 = [CI(mI, , m), .. Cn(m, ... , MA.
 That is, the constitution of a confederation is modeled
 as a function C, which maps vectors of district medians
 into vectors of district policies. This function may vary
 among districts and generally will be different in the
 applications- we explore below.
 To make the analysis tractable, we limit consider-
 ation to confederations in which CQ(ml, ..., mn) is
 linear:
 n
 C~Ml,... ., mn; X) = E ijM
 j=i
 with Xii ? 0, and Ej Xij = 1. That is, we make the
 simplifying assumption that a confederation can be
 represented by a matrix of influence coefficients, A =
 [XJi, where X1J is the influence of district] on the policy
 outcome in district i.
 The Representation/Centralization Axes
 Using this notation, the two special cases considered in
 Cremer and Palfrey (1996) were the following. At one
 extreme was CQ(m1, .. ., mO) = mi (independent
 districts), and at the other extreme was a size-weighted
 average of the district means:9
 n
 ~M 1 . . . ,mn) = OE1m1, for all i.
 j=1
 That article analyzed the induced individual prefer-
 ences between these two extreme confederations and
 identified conditions under which a majority of individ-
 uals (or a majority of districts) would prefer unification
 to independence.10 Here, we study the induced prefer-
 9 Since we have a normal distribution of voter ideal points within a
 district, the median ideal point in a district coincides with the mean
 ideal point in that district. Modelling the unified policy as a weighted
 mean simplifies the analysis and captures the main idea that the
 centralized policy will represent a compromise between the medians
 of the individual districts.
 We do not model the details of the policymaking process but note
 that the literature identifies many different circumstances in which
 outcomes are responsive to the mean rather than the median and/or
 in which outcomes vary continuously with the preferences of the
 members of the legislature. Examples include most models with
 uncertainty or private information (Ledyard 1984), probabilistic
 voting (Coughlin 1990; Hinich 1977), divided government (Alesina
 and Rosenthal 1995), and distributive politics (Banks and Duggan
 1998; Baron and Ferejohn 1989; Merlo 1997).
 10 Using the notation of influence coefficients, these two extremes
 correspond to XAt = 1 for all i (independence) and XAt = otj for all i
 and j (unification).
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 ences of individuals over a much richer set of possible
 confederations.
 In this article, we define unification more generally
 by Xiq = Xi for all i and j, with Xi not necessarily equal
 to ot. The case of X = otj, treated in our earlier article,
 corresponds to population representation. Unit represen-
 tation is defined by Xii = 1/n for all i, j. We can
 represent a continuum of multicameral unified systems
 using a parameter, y E [0, 1], that indexes the relative
 influence of population representation. In a unified
 system this would correspond to =
 y)/n. This defines what we call the representation
 dimension and spans all ranges of mixtures between
 purely population representation (y = 1) and purely
 unit representation (y = 0).
 Of course, nearly all unified confederations of states
 also have governments at the district level, so they are
 a cross between the two extremes of pure indepen-
 dence and full unification. We represent a continuum
 of degrees of centralization using a parameter P Ee [0,
 1], which represents the relative weight of the central
 government in determining policy outcomes in any
 given district. This defines what we call the centraliza-
 tion dimension, and spans all ranges of mixtures be-
 tween purely independent systems (( = 0) with no
 central government and fully unified systems (( = 1) in
 which districts have no autonomy at all.
 Putting these two dimensions together, we have the
 two main axes-representation and centralization-
 that determine our space of confederations. In the
 notation of influence coefficients, the policies in each
 district are determined according to
 Xii = 1 - (3+ P3(yot + (1 -y)/n),
 Aij = (P(yot + (1-y)/n).
 This restricts the set of admissible matrices of influence
 coefficients. Specifically, oti = oti, implies Xii = Xij for
 all i, i', and j that are not all equal to one another. In
 other words, the influence of a district on the policy
 outcome in another district is independent of the
 identity (but not the size) of that second district.
 The actual policy outcome in district i, C(m1, ...
 mn; Ot, I, y), is given by
 Ci(ml .. I mn; a, A, y) = mj((yoj + (1 - y)/n)
 jii
 + mj[1 - 3 + P3(-yoj + (1 - y)/n)]
 n n
 = (1 - )mi + i [y E ojmj + (1 - y) E mj/n
 Lj=l j=l
 = (1 - P3)mi + (3[YMh + (1 - Y)Ms],
 where Mh = In, otjmj, and Ms = In, mj/n can be
 interpreted as the House policy and the Senate policy,
 respectively.
 The rest of the article will characterize induced voter
 preferences and majority rule equilibria in this two-
 dimensional space of confederations.
 INDUCED PREFERENCES OF VOTERS
 In order to understand political conflict along these
 two basic dimensions of the confederation question, in
 this section we characterize the induced preferences of
 voters over the (1, y) space, represented by the square
 [0, 1] x [0, 1]. This characterization identifies the shape
 of voter indifference curves in this space and shows
 how the ideal points of voters in this space vary as a
 function of n, i, V, t, and the vector a.
 A voter is characterized both by his ideal point, t,
 and his district, i, and we will speak of the voter (i, t).
 To simplify the formulas and the exposition, we define
 0 = t2/(l + V), which is a measure of how extreme a
 voter's ideal point is relative to the unconditional
 expected ideal point. We use the term "voter (i, O)y to
 refer to the two voters, (i, 0(1 + V)) and (i,
 - \0(1 + V)), who are equally extreme and hence (as
 we formally prove below) have identical induced pref-
 erences over confederations. For such a voter, the
 utility of confederation ((, y) equals - WiJ(p, y),
 where WiJ(p, y) is the expected squared distance
 between voter (i, 0)'s ideal policy and the outcome
 under ((, y). Through standard computations similar
 to those detailed in Cremer and Palfrey (1996), we
 obtain
 Wio(3, y) = Em[U(Ci(m; o, (3, y); tlt]J0=t2(J+M
 1+ V - (3+ (/n + eti]2
 + V I [(/n + Otiy]2
 joi
 l+ [+v(2 n O-& )tiJ] (1)
 where
 1
 Cti = i- -.
 n
 The analysis is simplified by the substitution pu = Ad,
 which can be interpreted as the total weight of the
 House in the policies followed in the districts. This
 yields
 W~0(3 A =1 + V [(1 - n)+ +
 with the constraints 0 c ( 3 1 and 0 P , (3.
 Voter (i, 0) prefers the confederation that mini-
 mizes JWi', and level surfaces of J'J' are the indiffer-
 73
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 ence curves of type (i, 0) over different (3, pu) confed-
 erations.
 Convexity of W10
 Theorem 1 states that Wio is convex and therefore
 implies that the first-order conditions are sufficient to
 determine voter ideal points.
 THEOREM 1. For all values of the parameters, Wio is
 convex. It is strictly convex if and only if
 Ai--a + (n - 1) I oO
 joi
 Proof: See the Appendix.
 If we fix a1i, then the minimum of Ai is obtained
 when all the &1s are equal to one another and therefore
 equal to -&'i/(n - 1). In this case, Ai is equal to 0.
 This implies Ai > 0 and, furthermore, that the follow-
 ing corollary holds.
 COROLLARY 1. The function Wio is linear if and only if
 Ot. = U., for all j and j' not equal to i. Otherwise Wio is
 strictly convex.
 For most of the remainder of the article, we assume
 Ai > 0 for all districts. The case Ai = 0 is treated
 separately later.
 Indifference Maps in (f3, 1u) Space
 Except in unusual cases, the indifference curves are
 ellipses centered at different points of the pu = 0 axis.
 That is, all voters' ideal points correspond to unit
 rather than population representation, regardless of
 the size of a voter's state.
 THEOREM 2. The indifference curves of the voter of type 0
 in district i are ellipses, centered at (pY(0), ( (0)),
 where
 A?(0) = 0,
 and
 P30(0) + 1 - 0)V (3)
 1 + 0V A
 n
 If &3i = 0, the major axes of these ellipses have slope r,
 defined by
 1 nY(1 + V)En 12 + V(0 - 1) -2
 Irl - _ i[n + V + OV(n - 1)]
 (n- 1)
 and
 sgn r = sgn a&i. (5)
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 For any I, the slope of the indifference curves at the
 point (1, 0) is
 aWio/a n - 1
 aWiola ,u ndj(6)
 If &, = 0, the ellipses have their main axis parallel to
 the ( = 0 axis.
 Proof. See the Appendix.
 To summarize, if Ai > 0, then the slope of the main
 axis of the indifference curves of all voters in district i
 has the same sign. This slope is positive for all voters
 from large districts (&i > 0) and negative for all voters
 from small-districts (&i < 0). Furthermore, the slope
 of the indifference curves of any voter is constant along
 the i axis. This slope only depends on the size of her
 district and is of the same sign as the slope of the main
 axis of the indifference curves.
 Voters' Ideal Confederations
 Since WiO is strictly convex, we can characterize the
 ideal points by first-order conditions. It is clear geo-
 metrically, and easily checked, that the maximum of
 Wio is reached at the common center of the indiffer-
 ence curves of the voter, (pY?(0), (3(0)). It is then easy
 to identify the ideal feasible confederation.
 THEOREM 3. If Ai > 0 and 0 < 1, the voter's ideal feasible
 confederation is (pL*(0), P*(0)) = (0, (3(0)).
 If Ai > 0 and 0 > 1, then the voter's ideal feasible
 confederation satisfies
 A*(0) = P*(O) = 0.
 The function (3* is decreasing in 0.
 Proof. See the Appendix.
 Figure 1 illustrates the feasible set and some repre-
 sentative indifference curves for voters from three
 hypothetical districts. The horizontal axis is the cen-
 tralization dimension (1), and the vertical axis is the
 representation dimension (pu). The shaded area marks
 the set of feasible confederations. Voter 1 is an ex-
 treme voter from a large district. To illustrate the fact
 that every extreme voter's ideal confederation is (0, 0),
 the figure includes the indifference curve of voter 1 that
 passes through the origin. Voters 2 and 3 are moderate
 voters from large and small districts, respectively.
 Discussion and Comparative Statics
 The first part of theorem 3 states that moderate voters
 (0 < 1), regardless of the size of their district, are
 unanimously opposed to population representation.
 They prefer the national policy to be decided by
 representative institutions with the same number of
 delegates from each district, and they prefer power to
 be transferred to districts via decentralization rather
 than population representation. For any level of cen-
 tralization, (3, the variance of the centralized compo-
 nent is minimized by setting pu = 0. Because the only
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 FIGURE 1. Typical Indifference Curves of
 Voters in the f3 x ,u Plane
 P3*(O) //02 P* 13 P
 / ;
 //
 /
 Note: This figure illustrates the indifference curves of three voters. From
 theorem 2 and the discussion in the text, we see that 03 < 02 < 01. Voter
 3 is the most moderate of the three and is from a small district (the slope
 of the major axis of her indifference curve is negative). Voters 2 and 1
 are, respectively, a less moderate voter and an extreme voter, both from
 large districts. Voter 1 illustrates another point. He would like a negative
 A, but this is infeasible. The most preferred feasible confederation for
 such extreme voters is always (0, 0), since the indifference curve
 passing through (0, 0) cuts the diagonal from below.
 advantage of centralization is risk reduction, it follows
 that any voter's ideal confederation must have pi, = 0.
 The second half of the theorem is even simpler to
 understand. For extremist voters (0 > 1), the expres-
 sion obtained for I* from the first-order conditions is
 negative, so the feasibility constraints bind. They want
 no centralization at all, which corresponds to 0 = 0. At
 = 0, the only feasible value of p, is 0.
 Thus, we have established that the optimal confed-
 eration for all voters from all districts calls for no
 population representation at the national level. We
 should keep in mind, however, that this is not the same
 as saying that all voters always prefer unit representa-
 tion (this point is discussed in more detail in the next
 subsection).
 The comparative statics of how the ideal points
 change with respect to the exogenous parameters of
 the model are straightforward. For voters with 0 < 1, iA
 is easy to see that 13*(0) is increasing in n. The intuition
 behind this is simple. The moderation, or risk-reduc-
 tion, benefits of centralization are greater as n is
 greater, independent of district size, since having more
 districts reduces the probability that the centralized
 policy will be dominated by an extremist majority of
 one wing or the other. For similar reasons, P*(0) is
 decreasing in V. The higher is V, the more dispersed is
 the distribution of voter ideal points within a district, so
 there is a higher probability that the centralized policy
 will be on one extreme or the other.
 Conditional Ideal Points
 The final question we address is a voter's optimal value
 of pu as a function of 3: For a given degree of
 centralization, how much power does a voter want the
 House to have? The answer will be useful later in the
 article, when we study the properties of majority rule
 equilibrium.
 For voters with &3i # 0, the optimal value of p.
 generally depends on the choice of P. This relationship,
 >.*(M), depends on the orientation of the (ellipsoidal)
 indifference curves of the voters in (1, VL) space. To find
 the solution, consider again the first-order condition
 from differentiation of W with respect to p., holding M
 fixed:
 oti
 (1 -0)6i - 3-[n + V + OV(n - 1)]
 n
 + t(1 +V) A-(l - )V&2l 0.
 j=l .
 We solve for pL and summarize the results in the
 following theorem.
 THEOREM 4. Fix P. The optimal ideal confederation for a
 voter 0 from district i is
 if
 (1 - 0) - - [n + V + OV(n - 1)]_
 n
 A 2
 L(1 + V) IJ1R (1 - )VCxi _ M
 Otherwise, p*(I, 0) equals either 0 or 1, depending on
 whether the right-hand side of equation 7 is less than 0
 or greater than 1, respectively.
 Proof. See the Appendix.
 Whether p>*(13, 0) is greater than 0 depends on
 whether ai is greater than 0 (large districts) or less than
 o (small districts) and whether 1 is greater than or less
 than P*(0).
 Consider, first, the case of large districts. Since &^ >
 0, the sign of >*(13, 0) is the same as the sign of
 (1- 0) - 11+ 0V + (
 (1 + V) Ej~ &2 + (1 + 0 V)2
 Since the denominator is positive, >*(1i, 0) > 0 for 0>
 1. This establishes that all extremists in larger states
 75
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.115 on Tue, 08 Mar 2016 00:52:06 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Political Confederation March 1999
 prefer at least some degree of population representa-
 tion for every value of f3 > 0.11
 More generally, in large districts, >*(if, 0) > 0 if and
 only if P > 13*(0). That is, voters from large districts
 favor some degree of population representation if and
 only if there is too much centralization relative to their
 preferred level. The intuition is that by putting some
 weight on population representation, the large district
 can effectively recoup some of the sovereignty lost
 because of a high P. Voters from large districts who are
 sufficiently extreme want to do this. This can also be
 interpreted in the following way. Let .0*(P) be the
 solution of P *(0) = P. That is, 0*(f() is the voter for
 whom P is the ideal level of centralization. The critical
 value 0*(P) is decreasing in P, so voters in large
 districts prefer some degree of population representa-
 tion if and only if 0 < 0*(P). In other words, voters in
 large districts who are more extreme than 0*(P) would
 like some population representation. The critical value
 0*(P) is decreasing in P.
 Not surprisingly, preferences over P in small districts
 go in exactly the opposite direction. Voters from small
 districts favor some degree of population representa-
 tion if and only if P < P *(0). The intuition here is
 exactly the reverse of the previous intuition. In this
 case, relatively moderate voters (i.e., voters for whom
 P*(0) > P) want to cede even more sovereignty. This is
 done by increasing the weight on population represen-
 tation, since doing so reduces the influence of a small,
 district on the centralized component of the policy. For
 any fixed value of P there is a critical voter 0*(f(), such
 that voters from small districts prefer some degree of a,
 population representation if and only if 0 > 0*(P).
 One can conduct a similar analysis of conditional
 ideal points along the centralization dimension, fixing
 p. When p. = 0, a voter's conditional ideal degree of
 centralization does not depend on state size, as estab-
 lished in the previous sections. However, if p, > 0, so
 there is at least some mixture of population and unit
 representation,.then this is no longer the case; voters in
 large states will prefer more centralization than other-
 wise identical voters in small states. This is easy to see
 from inspection of Figure 1. Similarly, the greater is p,
 the more centralization voters in a large state desire,
 while the opposite is true for voters in small states.
 At this point, we can speculate that the qualitative
 features of the results we have obtained are robust to a
 variety of other specifications beyond our normal-
 quadratic model. For instance, as explained in Cremet
 and Palfrey (1996), it should be the case very generally
 that moderate voters prefer centralization. Further-
 more, the intuition behind the results on the relation-
 ship between district size and preferences over repre-
 sentation and centralization, as discussed in the three
 previous paragraphs, seems quite general.
 11 This is also straightforward geometrically. Consider voter 1 in
 Figure 1, and fix P to some strictly positive value, A'. The tangency
 between the vertical line , = ,S' and an indifference curve will occur
 for some strictly positive value of A~.
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 FIGURE 2. Informal Proof of Theorem 5
 L( Ond)
 I X
 | 3*(Omed)
 Note: The point marked f3*(0i ed) is the median ideal confederation in
 district i. It is also the majority voting equilibrium in district i. To show
 this, we have graphed the indifference curves through i*(O1 d) of a
 typical voter with a small 0 (the solid curve) and a typical voter with a
 large 0 (the dashed curve). Any move to a confederation such as the
 point marked x will be voted down by all the voters with 0 > 0ied and
 some with 0 < oMed. A move to a point such as the one marked with a
 dot will be voted down by all the voters with 0 < Oied and some with
 0 > 0rmed
 MAJORITY RULE EQUILIBRIUM
 Majority Rule Equilibrium within a District
 A majority rule equilibrium in district i is a centraliza-
 tion-representation pair ((, p) with the property that
 there does not exist another pair (1', p,') such that a
 majority of members in district i strictly prefer ((', p,')
 to ((, p,). One can show that every district has a
 majority rule equilibrium, (hi*, 0), where i i =
 (3* (oed), and 01 ed is the median value of 0 in district
 i. Moreover, if Ai > 0, then this is the unique majority
 rule equilibrium in that district. This is stated formally
 in theorem 5 and proved in the Appendix, with an
 informal proof and explanation in Figure 2.
 THEOREM 5. If Ai > 0, then ((3*(Oed), 0) is the unique
 majority rule equilibrium confederation within district
 i
 The within-district majority rule equilibrium,
 *(0ined), is independent of the relative size of the
 district, cxi, but varies systematically with the underly-
 ing parameters of the model, n and V. Specifically,
 *(0' ed) is increasing in n and decreasing in V, and it
 is larger the more moderate is the district's median
 voter ideal point.
 Equilibrium Confederations
 The analysis in the previous section does not address
 the aggregation of the induced preferences across the
 various districts to reach an interdistrict decision about
 the degree of centralization and the extent of popula-
 tion representation. This aggregation is central to
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 understanding how and why different systems of rep-
 resentation and centralization may arise, so we address
 it here in the context of an equilibrium model. We
 identify the range of possible equilibrium confedera-
 tions and consider two different concepts of majority
 rule equilibrium.
 First, we consider majority rule equilibrium repre-
 sentation, conditional on some fixed level of central-
 ization. We show how this equilibrium analysis implies
 that mixtures of population and unit representation
 (such as the House-Senate bicameral system in the
 United States) are likely to arise, particularly when
 preferences and district size are correlated in certain
 ways. Second, we look at unconditional equilibrium,
 which involves majority rule equilibrium in the two-
 dimensional space of representation X centralization.
 As is typically the case in more than one dimension, a
 majority rule equilibrium does not always exist, and
 nonexistence is particularly a problem in precisely
 those preference configurations where conditional
 equilibrium involves a mixture of population and unit
 representation. Thus, it is not surprising that we often
 observe a combination of these two kinds of represen-
 tation in real-world institutions.
 Conditional Equilibrium
 Here we separate out the issues of voting over the level
 of centralization, 1, and voting over the representation
 structure, R. As we see in the next subsection, it is often
 necessary to separate these two dimensions in order to
 guarantee the existence of a majority rule equilibrium.
 Thus, for any 1 E [0, 1], we define a 3-conditional
 equilibrium confederation to be a representation struc-
 ture,12 R, with the property that there does not exist
 another representation structure, R', such that a ma-
 jority of voters in the confederation prefer (1, j') to
 (1, [L). So a conditional equilibrium confederation is
 simply one against which any alternative confedera-
 tionwide referendum regarding the representation di-
 mension-with every voter in every district voting-
 would fail to win a majority of votes, fixing the level of
 centralization.13 Our first result is that for every 1 E [0,
 1] there exists a unique 1-conditional equilibrium
 confederation.
 THEOREM 6. If N > 2, then for every 1 E [0, 13 there exists
 a unique value of p E [0, 1], denoted pu*(P), such that
 (1, [j*(P)) is a 1-conditional equilibrium confedera-
 tion.
 Proof As established earlier, voters have unique con-
 ditional ideal points for any fixed centralization param-
 12 A R-conditional equilibrium confederation for any R. E [0, 1] can
 be defined in a similar fashion, but we limit our formal analysis here
 to the first kind of conditional equilibrium.
 13 There are other possible ways to aggregate votes at the confeder-
 ation level, including, for example, a convention to which each
 district sends a delegate, who is instructed to vote according to the
 majority preference within his district. Theorems 6-10 hold for this
 kind of vote aggregation, too.
 eter, f3. Theorem 4 implies that voters have single-
 peaked preferences over {(I, L)$ = f and p, E [0, 1]}.
 Therefore, by the median voter theorem, there is a
 3-conditional equilibrium confederation at p* (1) =
 P~n(I, Om) where m is the median conditional ideal
 point given P. Q.E.D.
 A natural question, then, is whether p*(,3) > 0 is
 either possible or probable. The answer is yes, but this
 depends on both the configuration of voter ideal points
 and the location of the median voter in states of
 different sizes.
 For simplicity, consider the following simple but
 robust example. There are three districts whose me-
 dian values of 0 are given by 01, 02, and 03, all strictly
 positive. We suppose CX < C2 < 1/3 < cov, and P*(01)
 < O() < P*(02) < P*(03), where 0 = oOtI + ct202 +
 0L303. We will show that for any level of centralization P
 in the interval (1*(01), *(02)) (which Aincludes 13(O)),
 the P-conditional equilibrium confederation, R*(f), is
 strictly positive.
 Indeed, by theorem 3, 1* is decreasing. Hence, for
 all 0 > 01, we have P3*(0) < P3*(O1). By continuity of
 preferences, for strictly more than half of the voters in
 district 1, 1*(0) < 1, and by the discussion that follows
 theorem 4, for all these voters >i*(I, 0) > 0, because
 district 1 is large.
 Similarly, for i = 2, 3, for all 0 < Oi, we have 1*(0)
 > P*(01). By continuity of preferences, for strictly
 more than half the voters in district i, 1 * (0i) > 1, and
 by the discussion that follows theorem 4, for all these
 voters >*(I, 0) > 0, because districts 2 and 3 are small.
 Hence, in all districts there is a majority of voters for
 whom >*(1) > 0, and we have proved the result.
 Furthermore, by continuity, if either 1*(02) is suffi-
 ciently close to 1*(03) or district 2 is sufficiently smaller
 than district 3, then for any 1 between 1*(01) and
 1*(03), the conditional equilibrium confederation is
 strictly positive. Since reasonable methods of choosing
 a constitution can be expected to-yield 1 in the interval
 [WO*(O), *(03)] (that is, between the minimum and
 maximum median district ideal degrees of centraliza-
 tion), the conditional equilibrium confederation
 would always involve a mixture of the two types of
 representation.
 Unconditional Equilibrium
 An unconditional equilibrium confederation is a central-
 ization-representation pair (1, 1i) with the property
 that there does not exist another pair (1', R') such that
 a majority of voters in the confederation prefer (1', R')
 to (,, p). So an unconditional equilibrium confedera-
 tion is simply one against which any alternative con-
 federationwide referendum-with every voter in every
 district voting-would fail to win a majority of votes. It
 is unconditional because we permit the referendum to
 change both the degree of centralization and the
 mixture of representation simultaneously.
 We can characterize the equilibrium as follows.
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 FIGURE 3. Informal Proof of Theorem 7
 Note: Suppose that e were an equilibrium. Then it must also be the
 majority voting equilibrium when choices are restricted to the line Au = Tt.
 This implies, however, that e cannot be a majority voting equilibrium
 restricted to PQ. To see this, first consider any voter whose most
 preferred point on A = ji is v2. By strict concavity and because her ideal
 confederation is on the horizontal axis, she prefers some point below e
 on PQ, such as V3, to v2 and therefore to e. Also by concavity of
 preferences, her ideal confederation on PQ will be to the left of e. Now
 consider the median voter on [k = Ft, whose indifference curve is
 represented in the figure. She prefers v1 to e, and her ideal confeder-
 ation on PQ will be to the left of e. By continuity, this will also be true for
 some voters whose ideal points on [k = Fi are "just" to the right of e.
 Hence, more than half the voters will have an ideal confederation on PQ
 to the left of e, and the contradiction is established. The proof in the
 Appendix formalizes the argument and takes care of potential equilibria
 on the boundary of the feasible set.
 THEOREM 7. If N > 2, then (1, ,i) is a majority rule
 equilibrium only if P, = 0 and 1 = 3*(0).
 Proof A formal proof is presented in the Appendix.
 An informal argument is illustrated in Figure 3.
 It should be stressed, however, that the existence of
 an equilibrium is not guaranteed. The argument for the
 existence of majority rule equilibria within a district
 relies heavily on the assumption that the induced (I, R)
 indifference maps of voters in the same district are
 elliptical and have the same slopes along the T-axis. In
 general, however, the indifference curves for voters
 vary in important ways across districts. In particular,
 the major axes of the elliptical indifference curves ate
 sloped upward for large districts and downward for
 small districts. This leads to situations in which major-
 ity rule equilibria may not exist, in the sense that there
 may not exist (I, R) pairs that are undefeated by
 majority rule, as shown by the example in Figure 4,
 which is related to the example in the previous subsec-
 tion.
 In Figure 4, the disequilibrium situation is due to the
 fact that the P*(o)-conditional equilibrium confedera-
 tion is positive. An equilibrium exists only if this is not
 the case, which requires the district means to be
 correlated with district size in a special way. For
 78
 example, if CL3 > CL2> 1/3 > (X, so that the two large
 states strongly prefer centralization, cycling would not
 occur, and there would be an unconditional equilib-
 rium at (1 **(0), 0). That is, if large states are on average
 more moderate, then an equilibrium with entirely or
 almost entirely unit representation becomes a possibil-
 ity. A possible example is the European Union, whose
 larger members led the push for unification. In this
 case we find primarily unit rather than population
 representation, which is consistent with the model.
 The Case of Ai = 0
 We treat this special case separately because the results
 are somewhat different and because it corresponds to
 several interesting problems that are similar to confed-
 eration and that commonly arise when there are only
 two districts. One such situation is civil war or separat-
 ist movements, which are the reversekof confederation
 and presumably arise because a large majority in one of
 the districts has preferences that are sufficiently distant
 from the median of the confederation. These are
 dyadic in character, pitting one member of the confed-
 eration against its complement. We hasten to add that
 there are also many examples of unification of two
 districts, including the Belgium-Luxembourg monetary
 agreement and the common U.S. phenomenon of
 municipality annexation and consolidation.
 THEOREM 8. If Ai = 0, then the indifference curves of the
 voters of district i are pairs of parallel lines given by:
 n (n- )
 where K is a constant. Each voter in such a district has
 a continuum of ideal points, consisting of the set of all
 confederations lying on the indifference line passing
 through the point *(0), defined in theorem 1.
 FIGURE 4. Example of Nonexistence of
 Equilibrium at the Confederation Level
 32 1
 13(Oi) 13( 0) 13( 02) 3(03)
 Note: This is a robust example of the absence of a majority rule
 equilibrium at the confederation level. There are three districts, i = 1, 2,
 3, with a3 < a2 < 1/3 < a1, whose median confederations are denoted
 I3(ol), /3(02), and p(03), respectively. If there were a majority rule equilib-
 rium, then it would have to be the confederation (f3 = f*(b), Au = 0),
 where 0 = 2,3 1 a,0,. This is not possible, by the following argument. We
 have represented the tangents to the indifference curves of the median
 voters of the three districts going through 0. The lighter arrows indicate
 the direction of the gradient of preferences at the presumed equilibrium.
 A small movement away from that equilibrium, such as that indicated by
 the thick arrow originating at (/3(0), 0), would increase the welfare of
 more than half the voters in each district. So (/3(0), 0) is not a majority rule
 equilibrium.
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 FIGURE 5. Informal Proof of Theorem 9
 ID*I
 (02)
 P( 01/ 1 \
 Note: The point ((3, j,) is preferred to the point marked by an asterisk by
 more than half the voters in each district: in district 1, all voters with 0 <
 0ped and some of the others; in district 2, all voters with 0 > O2ed and
 some of the others. It is easy to see that the same is true for all the
 points in the feasible set.
 Proof See the Appendix.
 When n = 2, A1 = A2 = 0, and we can show the
 following theorem.
 THEOREM 9. If n = 2, then there exists a unique majority
 rule equilibrium.
 Proof. See the Appendix. An informal proof is given
 in Figure 5.
 This equilibrium may lie anywhere between the a
 axis and the a = p, diagonal.
 In the special case in which otl = cx2 = 1/2, all
 confederations with the same , produce equivalent
 policies in every district, so uniqueness is defined
 relative to such equivalence classes of confederations.
 More generally, if all districts are of the same size,
 that is, if cxi = 1/n for all i, then the centralized policy
 is neutral with respect to p,, since the population and
 unit representation models are equivalent. Majority
 rule equilibria exist and are of the form (P*(O), p,),
 where 0 is the median 0 and p, is any value between 0
 and 1.
 CONCLUSION
 This article investigated questions of sovereignty and
 representation in confederations. We model sover-
 eignty formally by allowing policy outcomes in one
 district to be affected by the distribution of voters in
 other districts and by the relative size of districts. We
 model the representation dimension as a choice of the
 degree to which each district is represented propor-
 tionally to population as opposed to unit based. The
 balance of power between the two houses of the U.S.
 Congress is a classic example of how such trade-offs
 may be achieved in practice. The questions are posed
 at both the individual and aggregate level.
 At the individual level, the questions reduce to the
 following.
 (Ii) To what extent do voters prefer to sacrifice sov-
 ereignty of their own district in order to ensure
 more moderate policy outcomes?
 (12) How do voters in large states differ from voters in
 small states in terms of induced preferences over
 population versus unit representation?
 The answer to Ii generalizes the earlier findings in
 Cremer and Palfrey (1996). Induced preferences over
 sovereignty cut across traditional Left-Right cleavages.
 Instead, extremists from both sides of the political
 spectrum are in agreement and in opposition to rela-
 tively moderate voters, who prefer more centralization.
 Sufficiently extreme voters are "separatists," who ide-
 ally prefer no confederation at all. We also show that
 preference for more centralization (i.e., willingness to
 cede sovereignty) increases with n, decreases with V,
 and is independent of the size distribution of districts.
 The answer to I2 is more complicated. For all voters,
 the ideal confederation would consist entirely of unit
 representation, but preferences over representation
 cannot be disentangled from issues of centralization.
 That is, voters' induced preferences over population
 versus unit representation depend on the degree of
 centralization. When there is too much centralization,
 voters in large states would like some degree of popu-
 lation representation, which restores some local sover-
 eignty. The opposite is true for voters in small states,
 who would like some degree of population representa-
 tion only if there is too little centralization.
 At the aggregate level, there are two central ques-
 tions.
 (Al) What are the properties of majority rule equilib-
 rium in a district?
 (A2) What are the properties of majority rule equilib-
 rium across the whole federation?
 The answer to Al is that a majority rule equilibrium
 exists within each district and coincides with the ideal
 confederation of the median value of 0 in that district.
 The answer to A2 depends on whether one considers
 conditional or unconditional majority rule equilibrium.
 In a conditional equilibrium, for any fixed level of
 centralization, there is always a unique (conditional)
 majority rule equilibrium in the representation dimen-
 sion. This conditional equilibrium could correspond to
 cases in which the centralization dimension has already
 been settled, in which there is relatively little flexibility
 on the centralization dimension, or in which the
 agenda has been organized in a way that separates the
 two dimensions. In the unconditional equilibrium, the
 two dimensions are voted on simultaneously. As is
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 typical in such cases, a majority rule equilibrium may
 fail to exist due to majority voting cycles.
 In the conditional equilibrium, the representation
 dimension typically involves a mixture of population
 and unit representation, consistent with what one
 observes in a great many representative legislatures.
 The properties of conditional ideal points of voters
 suggest the kinds of coalitions that may form in a vote
 along the representation dimension. Ceteris paribus,
 moderate voters in small states and extreme voters in
 large states will push for greater weight on population
 representation, while moderates in large. states and
 extremists in small states will want to shift more weight
 to unit representation.
 The properties of unconditional equilibrium depend
 on whether there are two districts or more than two.
 With two districts, a unique equilibrium confederation
 always exists. Depending on the relative extremism of
 the median voters in the two states, the equilibrium
 degree of population representation can range from
 entirely unit representation to entirely population rep-
 resentation. With three or more districts, equilibrium
 may fail to exist. When it does exist, representation is
 entirely unit based.
 The possibility of majority rule cycling in the uncon-
 ditional equilibrium underscores the importance of
 agenda manipulation and procedural control at consti-
 tutional conventions. The empirical relevance of such
 manipulation has been noted in historical studies of
 constitutional conventions. For example, Riker (1984,
 1986) recounts numerous episodes of agenda manipu-
 lation at the U.S. Constitutional Convention of 1787,
 consistent with the sort of preference aggregation
 problem identified in this article. This suggests that an
 exploration of agenda effects in our model of confed-
 erations would be an interesting direction for further
 research.
 APPENDIX: FORMAL PROOFS OF
 THEOREMS-
 Proof of Theorem I
 The function Wio is convex if and only if the determinant
 1 a2Wio/a12 a2Wi0/aIaI
 Dio-I a2Wio/aIa. a2JJK/al21
 is nonnegative. W is strictly convex if and only if Dio > 0.
 Expanding Wio gives
 Wio(P' 1 = 1 + V > + I2(1 -)2 + 2
 - 2P 1 - + 2 ~Ldt 2PL 1 l
 0 n ) \2 n
 + V + 2&j + 2 + j/
 1 + V [ \ n/2 -)@2+VA&
 80
 +p2lvV[(1+V)Z&J2+V(O - )&121
 + 2P, 1 + v-1 - 0]
 -2 V +V (n V V ] +- 1+
 Taking partial derivatives gives
 (1 + V2
 n-i &
 2 (n+V +V(n-1)) - n + V+ OV(n-1)]
 --En + V +OJ(n-)] (1+ ) (X &2+V(O-1)642
 n+V+VO(n-) n-i -V n+V+0V(n--)] l
 = ' | -&n1+KZ j (-)i
 Hence, Di0 has the same sign as
 V(n - 1)(( + V) E] +j + +( - )&
 -&+(n + V + OV(n- 1)) = (1 + V)A,.
 Proof of Theorem 2
 To show that our quadratic function defines an ellipse, it is
 sufficient to show that the function is strictly convex, which is
 guaranteed by theorem 1. T~he center is found by setting the
 derivatives equal to 0, which yields
 (1-0)- + V+ OV(n - 1)] = 0 (9)
 through derivation with respect to -, and
 (1 -V)on-1 -[i+V+ 0J7(n -n1)]
 + Vj(1+ +V) - -1) (1 0)
 through derivation with respect to =. Multiplying equation 9
 by -&n and adding it to equation 10, we obtain
 n + VO~ -=X
 S (nceA +> a theF) sm sVi2- (n + s.
 Sinc~i O.theterm in brackets is not equal to 0, 50 pY(0)
 = 0, and we find + (0) by substituting ) = 0 into equation 9.
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 To see that the absolute value of r satisfies equation 4, we
 apply the standard formula for the slope of an ellipse, which
 is
 1 A-B
 r - -= C
 r C '
 whereA is the coefficient on 2, B is the coefficient on p7, and
 C is the coefficient on APt in the quadratic expression for
 Wi(p, pi). Note that r - 1r is increasing on (-oo, 0) and (0,
 +oo) and takes values on both these intervals on (-oo, +oo).
 Therefore, the formula only determines r up to its sign. The
 formula gives
 1
 r
 (1 + P = j +)0l&i 2 o + V _ V0(n 1)VO]
 (O ~ 2[n +V+ VO(n-) ]
 --En + V+ OV(n - 1)]
 n~~~~~
 &O[n + V+ OV(n -1)] nci
 1 n - 1 n((1 + I)Zi &j + (1 + V0)&
 &i \ n n + V + OV(n - 1)
 The sign of r is the opposite of the sign of A/C and hence
 the sign of &*i
 To prove equation 6, observe that
 aWi0/a13I>=
 _n +)[1 + 0 + (n + V+ VO(n - 1))]
 +V [&i( - 0) - n&j(n + V + OV(n - 1))
 n-i 1
 n -ci
 Proof of Theorem 3
 If 0 < 1, then 130(0) E- [0, 1], and the feasibility constraints
 (13 GE [0, 1] and pL GE [0, 13]) do not bind. The solution given by
 the first-order conditions characterizes the minimum value of
 W over the set of feasible confederations. Hence,
 =0,
 and
 P .n(i- 0)
 -n + V+ (n - 1)0W'
 If 0 > 1, then the unconstrained value of 13* is negative, so
 at least one constraint (13 GE [0, 1] or pL GE [0, 13]) must bind.
 From equation 6, the slope of the indifference curve at (0, 0)
 is either negative or strictly greater than 1. Therefore, (0, 0)
 is a local maximum in the feasible set and, by convexity, a
 global maximum.
 To see that 13* is decreasing in 0, simply rewrite 130(0) as
 1 +V/ + Vf in
 and notice that the numerator is decreasing in 0 while the
 denominator is increasing.
 Proof of Theorem 4
 Solving equation 10 for pi, we get
 (1- ) i - -n + V + OV(n - 1)]
 (1 + V) E &2 (1 O)V&2
 If this 1i satisfies the feasibility constraints, then it is equal
 to p*. Otherwise, by convexity of W, the solution lies on the
 boundary, as described in the theorem.
 Proof of Theorem 5
 First notice that if 1 * (61 d) C 0, then the result is trivial, as
 (0, 0) is the most preferred point in the feasible set for more
 than half the voters (those for whom 13* (0) ? 0).
 Thus, suppose 1 * (0nd) > 0. Consider in Figure 2 the two
 half-planes defined by the line L (0ed), following the major
 axis of the indifference map of voter O ed and passing
 through (P*(0i ed), 0). Consider any point in the half-plane
 consisting of all points to the left of this line, such as the dot
 in the figure. Since the major axes of the voters are parallel to
 each other along the 1-axis, it follows immediately that all
 voters with 0 such that 1 *(0) > P *(Oied) prefer *(Oied) to
 y. This is, by definition of 1 * (0' ed), exactly half the voters, so
 ,that y does not defeat P*(0i'ed) by a majority. A similar
 argument applies to any point in the right half-plane, such as
 the point marked with a cross in the figure. In this case, all
 voters with 0 such that P 1*(0) < P * (Oi ed) prefer * (O ed) to
 y, so y does not defeat P * (Omed) by a majority.
 To show uniqueness of the majority rule equilibrium,
 notice that for any point (1', pL') not equal to (a * (Omed), 0),
 continuity implies that all voters with ideal points in a
 neighborhood of (13(iied), 0) prefer it to (1', pL'). By the
 argument above, it is also true that either all voters to the left
 of famed or all voters to the right of famed prefer (1*(0ded) 0)
 to (1', p'). Thus, a strict majority prefers (P*(0' ed), 0) to
 (1', p'), which cannot be a majority rule equilibrium.
 Proof of Theorem 7
 By corollary 1, under the conditions of the theorem, Ai > 0
 for all i, and therefore all indifference curves are ellipses.
 We first show pi = 0. Suppose not, and consider an
 equilibrium e = (I, Ii), with pi E (0, 1] and 1 > 0. Denote
 by 1 ,(0, 03) the optimal 1 for a type 0 voter from a district
 with relative size &^i, given I. Formally, this is obtained by
 rearranging the first-order condition, equation 4, to get:
 n(l - 0) n____^
 13=n + V+ (n -1)0V +n- 1
 Note that this may fall outside the feasible bounds given by
 the restriction that P13(0, &i) E [ii, 1]. Since we have
 supposed that (1, IL) is a majority rule equilibrium, it must be
 the case that 1 3*(0, 03) > i for 50% of the voters and i *1(0,
 &ti) < for 50% of the voters. If not, then one could either
 increase or decrease 1 slightly, keeping pL fixed at IL, and a
 majority would vote for the new proposal. Now consider all
 voters for whom 1 ,*(0, &l) K 1. A typical voter like this is
 shown in Figure 3, where we denote 131(0, ai) by v2.
 Now consider rotating the horizontal line, defined by P =
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 { (13, L) I = pi} clockwise by a very small angle of rotation,
 4. (If ji = I, then rotate the horizontal line counterclock-
 wise.) This new (downward-sloping) line, denoted PQ, is
 shown in the figure. For each voter type (0, &i), definep p(0,
 &i) as this voter's most preferred feasible confederation,
 restricted to PQ. The point, p*p (0, Ii), for the typical voter
 described above is marked v in the figure. Because the
 preference gradient for this voter points directly downward at
 v2, this implies that v3 lies to the left of e. This is also true for
 any voter for whom a *1(0, &i) = 1, as illustrated by the point
 labelled v1 in the figure, and by continuity it is also true for a
 positive measure of voters for whom P13(0, &i) < 1, such
 that 1 ,*(0, &i) is sufficiently close to 1. Thus, there must exist
 a proposal lying to the left of e on P(, that a majority of voters
 prefer to (1, IL). Therefore, (1, IL) cannot be a majority rule
 equilibrium if ii > 0.
 Finally, suppose that (13, 0) is a majority rule equilibrium,
 where P 0 1*(O). Then there exists a majority of voters such
 that either 1*(O) < 3 or 1*(0) > 1. Suppose without loss of
 generality there is a majority of voters such that f*(0) > 1.
 Then, for small enough a, for all 1' E (3, 1 + e), a majority
 would prefer (1', 0) to (1, 0). Thus, a necessary condition for
 (r, I) to be an equilibrium is that 3 = *(O) and I = 0.
 Proof of Theorem 8
 The coefficient of p2 in equation 8 is equal to
 1 + V [(1 + V) &+(1+vo)& .
 If Ai = 0, this is equal to
 V&2 j-+v 1
 1 + v Ln - 1 +
 v&2
 (i - 1)(1 + V) [V+ n + V0(n - 1)].
 This enables us to rewrite equation 8 as follows:
 V(n -l) "1 tpi 2
 Wio(p, ) = ( v[n + v + VO (n - 1)]( - P n - )
 V / (& n -+0
 1 + V n (n -1) 1 + V
 which shows that Wio is a quadratic function of f/n -
 >&Jl(n - 1). The indifference curve associated with the
 minimum of Wio will therefore be a single straight line of
 equation P1/n - pAi/(n - 1) = K for some K, and the
 indifference curves associated to greater values of Wio will be
 pairs of such straight lines.
 Proof of Theorem 9
 If U-1 = U-2 = 1/2, then all voters have vertical indifference
 lines. Consider the ideal line of voter 0 = 1/2 01 + 1/2 02, where
 01 and 02 are the medians of district 1 and district 2,
 respectively. Any point (1**(0), pL) such that pL E [0, 1] is an
 equilibrium.
 Next suppose that a > a-2. LetP*(0i) andpP*(02) denote
 the ideal lines of 01 and 02, respectively. It is easily verified
 that these two lines have slopes that are equal in magnitude
 (greater than 1), with opposite signs; P*(0k) is upward
 sloping, and P*(02) is downward sloping.
 There are three cases to consider, depending on the
 position of the intersection of p*(O1 ed) and P*(O2 ed):
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 Case 1: The intersection lies at some point (I, I), with ji E
 (0, a).
 Case 2: It lies below the horizontal axis.
 Case 3: It lies above the diagonal.
 Case 1 is easiest because, for any ((3, pu) + (3, Du), less than
 50% of the voters prefer (I, pL) to (I jI). Thus, (I, IL) is a
 majority rule equilibrium. Obviously, no other point can be a
 majority rule equilibrium in this case. This is illustrated by
 Figure 5.
 In case 2, consider the indifference line of the voter with
 the median preference 0 = a1-,ed + a-20Jd. For voters of
 this type, the median ideal confederation, e = *(O), lies on
 the horizontal axis (p = 0), regardless of whether they are in
 the large or small district. Since the intersection of P*(Or)
 and P*(02) lies below the horizontal axis, a majority of
 district 1 voters have ideal lines to the right of the 0 ideal line,
 and a majority of district 2 voters have ideal lines to the left
 of the 0 ideal line. Therefore, (1*(0), 0) is a majority rule
 equilibrium. It is easy to verify that there is no other (1, pL)
 that can be an equilibrium.
 Case 3 is slightly more complicated. Consider the prefer-
 ences of voters restricted to (1, AL) on the diagonal. The ideal
 policy on this diagonal for a 0red voter, P * = 3.'(0red), is to
 the left of the ideal policy on this diagonal for a 02 voter,
 p* (O,,ed) . Hence, there is a point between e * = l(omed)
 and 13P* =,(O2jed) that represents the median ideal point
 restricted to the diagonal. Let us name it M*. Notice,
 however, that it does not correspond to 13* =,, (0), since the
 ideal point on the diagonal for a 0 type voter differs depend-
 ing on whether s/he is in a small or a large district. The
 indifference line for the district 1 voter that passes through
 M* corresponds to a voter with a lower 0 than the district 2
 voter whose indifference line passes through M*. Now, by an
 argument similar to case 2, it is clear that a majority of district
 1 voters have ideal lines to the left of M*, and a majority of
 district 2 voters have ideal lines to the right of M*, but exactly
 half the voters overall have ideal lines to the right of M*, half
 to the left. Because the slope of the indifference lines for
 voters from district 1 is greater than 1, those indifference
 lines cut the diagonal from below. Therefore, any move to the
 right of M* is opposed by a majority, as is any move down.
 Therefore, M* is a majority rule equilibrium. It is easily
 verified that no other point can be a majority rule equilib-
 rium.
 14 There is also the trivial case where the intersection occurs in the 1
 < 0 region, in which case the majority rule equilibrium is p3 = =
 0.
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